mailcheckSPF · DKIM · DMARC

Google and Yahoo's sender requirements

Last checked 31 July 2026

In February 2024, Google and Yahoo began enforcing a shared set of requirements on people who send them mail. A large number of organisations discovered at that point that they had no idea what SPF, DKIM or DMARC were. The requirements have not loosened since, and Microsoft has since moved in the same direction.

What is required

Everyone sending to Gmail or Yahoo:

Additionally, for bulk senders — roughly 5,000+ messages a day to Gmail addresses:

The threshold is not the useful part

The 5,000-a-day figure gets quoted constantly, and it distracts from the practical reality: the authentication requirements are applied broadly, and a domain without SPF, DKIM and DMARC is treated with suspicion regardless of volume.

More to the point, the threshold counts messages to Gmail addresses specifically, across everything sent from your domain — marketing, transactional, and whatever your support desk emits. Organisations routinely cross it without anyone deciding to.

If you are wondering whether the rules apply to you, the question is not worth answering. Do the authentication work.

Alignment is where people fail

This is the requirement that catches organisations that thought they were fine.

Passing SPF is not sufficient. The domain that passed SPF must match the domain in the From: header your recipient sees.

A typical failure: your marketing platform sends on your behalf using its own envelope domain. SPF passes — for their domain. Your From: header says hello@yourcompany.com. Those do not align, so DMARC fails, even though a naive check shows SPF passing.

The fix is almost always DKIM. Configure the platform to sign with d=yourcompany.com using a selector they give you, and alignment works regardless of the envelope domain. Every serious sending platform supports this; it is usually called something like “authenticate your domain” or “custom domain setup” in their onboarding.

DKIM has a second advantage: it survives forwarding. SPF breaks the moment a message is forwarded, because the forwarding server is not in your SPF record. If you rely on SPF alone, every mailing list and every user-configured forward becomes a DMARC failure.

How to tell whether you comply

dig +short TXT yourdomain.com | grep spf1      # SPF present?
dig +short TXT _dmarc.yourdomain.com           # DMARC present?

DKIM is harder to verify from DNS alone, because selectors cannot be enumerated — you have to know the name your provider uses, or guess it. The reliable check is to send yourself a message and look at the headers: in Gmail, open the message, choose “Show original”, and look for SPF: PASS, DKIM: PASS and DMARC: PASS.

That header view is the single most useful diagnostic available, and it is free.

What failure looks like

Not a bounce. That is the difficulty.

Mail gets throttled, or filed as spam, or quietly rejected in a way that never reaches whoever sent it. Your open rates drift down. Someone eventually mentions that they stopped getting your invoices. By then it has usually been happening for months.

This is why DMARC reporting matters even at p=none: the aggregate reports are the only feedback channel that tells you what receivers actually did with your mail.

A reasonable order of work

  1. Publish SPF listing every system that sends as you.
  2. Turn on DKIM at each of those systems, signing with your domain.
  3. Publish v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@yourdomain.com.
  4. Read the reports for a month. Fix whatever is failing alignment.
  5. Move to p=quarantine, then p=reject.
  6. Add one-click unsubscribe to anything resembling marketing.

Steps 1 to 3 can be done in an afternoon. Step 4 is the one that takes real time, and it is the one that cannot be skipped.